Fiscal Decentralisation and Risks to State Integrity in Ukraine (2010)

Most policy makers and politicians in Ukraine agree on economic reasons for decentralised provision of public services and for stronger local budgets. At the same time, when political parties access central-level policy making, their choices seem to reflect anxieties over risks of political regionalisation at the level of oblasts. The risks are, allegedly, in a potential threat to national integrity in the case of delegating sufficient fiscal autonomy to the regional authorities for implementing their (hypothetical) centrifugal aspirations.

Our hypothesis is that propensity to such assessment of risks in decentralisation is based on fundamentally misguided analysis of dynamics in sustainability of multi-layer state administration. Ukraine’s policy-making in this area often involves judgments on the balance of centrifugal and centripetral vectors which do not rest on objective evidence. Moreover, such analysis is often replaced by intuitive conclusions of mythological origin. As a result, key players are prone to excessive skepticism over the system’s stability, which provokes a vicious circle of overcentralised public administration, which, in turn, fuels centrifugal aspirations and reinforces risks of disintegration.

To test this hypothesis, we propose to start an evidence-based research of stability in the system of relations between levels of government in Ukraine (with support from LGI/OSI).

Authors: Kateryna Maynzyuk, Yuriy Dzhygyr

 

 

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